Semi-quantum key distribution protocols are designed to allow two parties to establish a shared secret key, secure against an all-powerful adversary, even when one of the users is severely restricted in their quantum capabilities. While interesting from a theoretical standpoint, these protocols have the disadvantage that a two-way quantum communication channel is necessary which generally limits their theoretical efficiency and noise tolerance. In this paper, we construct a new semi-quantum key distribution (SQKD) protocol which actually takes advantage of this necessary two-way channel, and we show it is able to tolerate a channel noise level higher than any prior SQKD protocol to-date. We also compare the noise tolerance of our protocol to other twoway fully quantum protocols, along with BB84 with Classical Advantage Distillation (CAD). Here we discover that our new protocol's noise tolerance is higher than other two-way fully quantum protocols; it also compares favorably to BB84 with CAD (and we discover some interesting quantum-level differences between the two). Along the way, we develop techniques that can be applied to the security analysis of other (S)QKD protocol reliant on a two-way quantum communication channel.
However, if we provide A and B with quantum communication capabilities, this impossibility result no longer holds. Indeed, with Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols, it is possible for A and B to agree on a shared secret key (which is simply a classical string of 0's and 1's) which is secure against an all-powerful adversary. That is, unlike in the classical case where computational assumptions must be made, in the quantum case, the only assumption that must be made is that the laws of quantum physics apply to E.
Thus, if both parties A and B only have classical capabilities, information theoretic key distribution is impossible; if both parties have quantum capabilities, perfect security is possible. Is there a middle-ground? In 2007, Boyer et al., [1] introduced the semiquantum model of cryptography in order to shed light on this question. A protocol that is semi-quantum requires only one of the honest participants to be quantum capable while the other participants are "classical." For the key-distribution problem, a semi-quantum key distribution (SQKD) protocol requires A to be the quantum user (who is able to work with qubits in arbitrary manners) while the other user, B, is the classical user (who is restricted to working in a single basis or disconnecting from the quantum channel -we will discuss the exact capabilities of both users later in this paper).
While the benefits to studying the semi-quantum model are, perhaps, primarily for the theoretical interest in helping to answer the question "how quantum must a protocol be to gain an advantage over a classical one?" there may also be practical benefits to these protocols. Indeed, in an SQKD protocol, most of the complexity is "pushed" to the quantum user, leaving the classical user with fewer resource requirements. Alternatively, one could envision the classical user as originally being a quantum user whose hardware "shut-down" (to save power or due to malfunction). If for example the equipment malfunctions on a remote satelite, it could take extensive time and money to repair; meanwhile the communication infrastructure suffers from a usability standpoint. However, if instead one switches to a "semiquantum" mode in this case, secure communication may possibly continue until repairs are made.
Despite the theoretical, and potential practical, benefits to the semi-quantum model, there is one severe draw-back in that a two-way quantum communication channel is required for their operation (see Figure 1 ). Such a channel allows a qubit to travel from the quantum user A, to the limited classical user B, then back to A. This potentially introduces greater noise as a qubit must travel farther. While favorable noise tolerances have been computed for some SQKD protocols now (see [2, 3, 4] ; in particular, as shown in [3] , the original SQKD protocol of Boyer et al. [1] has a noise tolerance which exactly matches that of BB84 [5] operating over two independent channels), this limitation has been a bottleneck in these results.
In this work we turn this disadvantage into an advantage by proposing a new protocol, based on a modified version of the original SQKD protocol constructed by Boyer et al., [1] . This new protocol takes advantage of information transmitting on both channels to improve noise tolerance. though at a potential cost of efficiency. In fact, we will show that the noise tolerance for our new protocol is 26%. This is higher than any other semi-quantum protocol which has thus far been analyzed. This is also higher than, to our knowledge, other fully- Figure 1 : A standard SQKD protocol. Alice begins by sending qubits, prepared in arbitrary bases, to Bob. Bob, the "classical" or "semi-quantum" user is allowed only to work directly with the computational Z basis, consisting of states |0 and |1 , or he may disconnect from the channel and reflect everything back to A (thus learning nothing about the qubit state). When a qubit returns, A is allowed to perform any quantum operation on the qubit. Eve is allowed to attack both forward and reverse quantum channels separately; she may also intercept, but not tamper with, any message sent on the classical authenticated channel (depicted as a dashed line on the bottom of the diagram). quantum (i.e., not semi-quantum) two-way protocols (such as LM05 [6] and the PingPong Protocol [7] which, as shown in [8] achieve at most 12%). Furthermore, this is substantially higher than many one-way fully quantum protocols.
We make several contributions in this work. First, we propose a new protocol that successfully takes advantage of the two-way nature of the quantum communication channel in order to improve noise tolerance. This is the first time such a task has been achieved in the semi-quantum model (and to our knowledge in the fully-quantum model also). Second, we perform an information theoretic security analysis of the protocol computing its key-rate and noise tolerance. To do so, we also extend the technique of mismatched measurements [9, 10, 3] to support additional information from a third basis on a two-way channel; these techniques can be applied to other SQKD (or even other fully-quantum protocols using a two-way channel) extending the applicability of the results in this paper. Finally, we compare our results to standard QKD protocols in particular with BB84. To be completely fair we also compare our results to that of BB84 with Classical Advantage Distillation techniques applied. We show that our protocol's noise tolerance and efficiency is higher for certain CAD techniques and, while investigating this, we discover a very interesting property of our protocol, namely that E's uncertainty is higher in our two-way protocol than it would be in BB84 with CAD for certain, realistic, channel scenarios. This result may spur future research in the design of advantage distillation protocols operating over quantum channels as opposed to classical ones (such as standard CAD techniques).
Semi-Quantum Cryptography
Since its creation in 2007 by Boyer et al., in [1, 11] , SQKD research has expanded greatly to include newer protocols, new primitives beyond key-distribution, and new proof techniques to argue about security.
In the semi-quantum model a two-way quantum channel connects two users A and B (see Figure 1) . One participant, typically B, is forced to be "classical" or "semi-quantum" in nature in that he may only directly operate in the computational Z basis (consisting of states |0 and |1 ); or he may choose to "disconnect" from the quantum channel. The other user, A, may be "fully quantum" and thus prepare, measure, and interact with quantum resources in arbitrary ways.
More specifically, these protocols typically begin with A producing quantum bits and sending them to the limited, "classical", user B. This user, on receiving a qubit, is allowed to perform one of two operations:
1. Measure and Resend: If B chooses this option, he will perform a Z basis measurement on the qubit resulting in outcome |r for r ∈ {0, 1}. He will then send a qubit to A in the state |r . B is only allowed to measure and send in the Z basis.
2. Reflect: In this case, B simply ignores the incoming qubit and reflects it back to A. The qubit remains undisturbed, however B learns nothing about its state.
One trend among SQKD research is to produce new protocols requiring even fewer quantum capabilities of the two users. Originally SQKD protocols placed resource restrictions only on the "classical user" Bob. However, in 2009 Zou et al., [12] introduced several new SQKD protocols utilizing resource restrictions also on the quantum user in that she could not prepare arbitrary states; indeed one such protocol permitted A to only prepare a single, publicly known state (called a single-state protocol). Other works have also analyzed the case when the quantum user is restricted to sending only one (or few) states [13, 4] . Limitations on A's measurement capabilities, in addition to her source preparation abilities, are also possible [14] . Researchers have also considered further restricting the capabilities of the classical user B [15] .
Beyond standard point-to-point key distribution, the notion of mediated semi-quantum key distribution was introduced in [16] , with an improved protocol introduced in [17] . In this model, a fully-quantum server (who prepared and measured quantum states) was utilized allowing two "classical" users to establish a shared secret key with one another. Rigorous security proofs (including noise tolerance computations) exist for some protocols, even if the server is adversarial [16] .
As far as security is concerned, most SQKD protocols are proven to be robust, a notion introduced in [1] . A protocol is robust if, for any attack causing an adversary to learn nonzero information, there is a non-zero probability that the adversary may be detected. More rigorous notions of security have been proven for some SQKD protocols. In [3] , the noise tolerance and key-rate of the original SQKD protocol has been shown to match that of BB84 assuming the technique of mismatched measurements is used. Mismatched measurements, which utilize statistics such as the probability of measuring a |0 if a |+ were initially sent, are a useful technique used to improve the noise tolerances of many one-way QKD protocols [9, 10] ; in [3] the technique was extended to two-way semi-quantum protocols for the first time. If mismatched measurements are not used, the current best noise tolerance for the original SQKD protocol was found to be 6.14% [18] (though the proof technique used in that paper, involving a reduction to an entanglement based one-way protocol, only found a lower-bound; it is still an open question as to whether the full 11% noise tolerance can be found without mismatched measurements). In [4] the noise tolerance of a single-state protocol originally introduced in [12] (and proven only to be robust in that original paper) was found to be 9.65%.
Beyond key distribution itself, the semi-quantum model has been used for other cryptographic tasks including secret sharing [19, 20, 21, 22] , direct communication [23, 24, 25] , and quantum private comparison [26, 27, 28, 29] . There has also been work recently in analyzing SQKD protocols in more practical settings (where it is impossible for B to accurately perform the Measure and Resend operation as he cannot prepare a photon in exactly the same state it was received) [30, 31, 32] .
However, of all the semi-quantum protocols in existence, none, to our knowledge, actually take advantage of the two-way quantum channel (beyond, of course, permitting B to be classical in nature). In this work, we introduce a new protocol, modified from the original Boyer et al., protocol [1] and conduct an information theoretic security analysis computing its key-rate and noise tolerance. We show that our modified protocol can actually strategically use the two-way quantum channel to increase noise tolerance (at a potential cost of decreased efficiency). In some way, our protocol uses the two-way quantum channel to run a simulated classical advantage distillation (CAD) protocol [33, 34] . However, when we later compare our results with CAD applied to BB84, we discover some rather surprising results.
Notation
Given a random variable A, we define H(A) to be the Shannon entropy of A. Namely, if A takes value i with probability p i , for i = 1, · · · n, then:
where all logarithms in this paper are base two. If A takes only two values, we write H(p 1 ) to mean H(p 1 , 1 − p 1 ). We denote by H(A|B) to be the conditional Shannon entropy defined H(A|B) = H(AB) − H(B), where H(AB) is the joint entropy of AB defined in the obvious way.
We denote by the computational basis, or Z basis, states of the form |0 and |1 . The X basis consists of states of the form |± = (|0 + i(−1) j |1 ). Given a density operator ρ acting on Hilbert space H A , we often write ρ A to signify the space on which the operator acts. Thus, we write ρ AB to mean a density operator acting on Hilbert space H A ⊗ H B (the definition and dimension of the respective Hilbert spaces will be clear from context). Given ρ AB , we write ρ B to mean the operator resulting from the partial trace over the A system; that is, ρ B = tr A ρ AB . This notation extends to three or more systems. Also, given |ψ ∈ H A , we write [ψ] A to mean |ψ ψ| A . If the context is clear, we forgo writing the subscript.
Given density operator ρ A we define S(A) ρ to mean the von Neumann entropy of ρ A (i.e., S(A) ρ = S(ρ A ) = −tr(ρ A log ρ A )). We write S(A|B) ρ to mean the conditional von Neumann entropy of the A register of state ρ AB conditioned on the B register, namely: S(A|B) ρ = S(AB) ρ − S(B) ρ . If the context is clear, we will forgo writing the subscript "ρ." Definition 1.1. A state ρ AB is said to be a classical-quantum state (or cq-state) if it can be written in the form:
where {|a } is an orthonormal basis for H A .
Finally, we will use the following theorem from [3] :
Let ρ AE be a cq-state of the form:
where the |E j i are arbitrary (not necessarily normalized nor orthogonal) vectors in H E , then:
where:
General QKD Security
A QKD protocol typically operates in two stages: a quantum communication stage and a classical post-processing stage. The first utilizes the quantum channel, along with the authenticated classical channel, in order for A and B to output (privately to themselves of course) each a raw-key. This is a string of classical bits which are partially correlated (there may be some noise in the quantum channel) and partially secret (an adversary may have some information -either classical or quantum -on the raw key). Thus, this raw key cannot be used directly for other cryptographic tasks. Instead it must be further processed in the second stage. The second stage, using only the authenticated channel, typically consists of an errorcorrection protocol followed by a privacy amplification protocol. This yields a secret key for A and B on which E has negligible information; these processes fail only with negligible probability. As we are interested in the asymptotic scenario in this work (where the size of the raw-key approaches infinity), these error probabilities vanish. For more information on these two standard processes, the reader is referred to the survey [35] .
Before error correction and privacy amplification, however, there are other classical protocols that may be run at this stage. One interesting approach is to run a classical advantage distillation (CAD) protocol which serves to increase A and B's raw key correlation. CAD has been applied to several protocols, including BB84, and has been shown to increase noise tolerance significantly. We will revisit CAD applied to BB84 later in this work when evaluating our new protocol and comparing with current state-of-the-art protocols.
One important computation in any QKD protocol security proof is its key-rate. If N is the size of the raw-key after the quantum communication stage, and (N ) ≤ N is the size of the secret key after privacy amplification, then the key-rate is defined to be:
Another important variant of this ratio is the effective key-rate which takes into account that not all iterations of the quantum communication stage yield a valid raw key bit. We extend the definition here to also take into account the total number of qubits prepared by the protocol (normally, for one-way protocols such as BB84, there is only one qubit per iteration so this extension is meaningless there; however with a SQKD protocol there are actually two qubits per iteration prepared which should be taken into account to perform a fair comparison). Thus, the effective key rate better measures the efficiency of a QKD protocol and is defined as:
where K is the number of qubits sent. For an SQKD protocol, it is not difficult to see that N , the expected raw-key size, is simply:
where p acc is the probability that, on any particular iteration of the quantum communication stage, that iteration yields a valid raw-key bit. Thus:
Beyond this, there are three primary forms of attack models considered when analyzing QKD security. These are:
1. Individual Attack: An individual attack requires E to attack each iteration of the QKD protocol independently and identically. Note that if multiple qubits are sent on each iteration, those qubits need not be attacked identically; for instance, the attack on the second qubit may depend on the first, but for each iteration, the attack is identical. On each iteration, E probes the qubit, possibly entangling it with a quantum ancilla. The adversary, however, is forced to measure her ancilla (using an optimal measurement) yielding a classical register. (That is, in an individual attack, before privacy amplification, Eve does not have a quantum system but a classical one.)
2. Collective Attack: These are similar to individual attacks in that E must attack each iteration independently and identically. However she is not forced to measure her ancilla and may in fact maintain a quantum memory for an arbitrary amount of time and perform any arbitrary, coherent, measurement of her entire ancilla later.
3. General Attack: For this model, no assumptions are made on the power of the adversary.
It is known that individual attacks are weaker than collective attacks [35] . Surprisingly, it is not known whether collective attacks are weaker than general attacks. With very few exceptions for certain "nice" protocols, most QKD security proofs are performed assuming collective attacks. Usually, at least in the asymptotic scenario, security against collective attacks implies security against general attacks for protocols which are permutation invariant [36, 37, 38] .
Under collective attacks, it was shown in [39, 40] that the following equation, known as the Devetak-Winter Key Rate, holds:
where the infimum is over all collective attacks which induce the observed channel statistics (e.g., noise). The entropy computations are done over cq-states describing the protocol's raw-key output bit and Eve's quantum memory for one iteration. Computing H(A|B) is generally trivial, instead it is the computation of the von Neumann entropy S(A|E) that requires great effort in a QKD security proof. Once a key-rate expression is derived, one generally wishes to evaluate it. Naturally, were the protocol run in practice, the noise values would be observed directly. Here, however, we wish to evaluate our key-rate under certain "reasonable" noise scenarios. Perhaps the most common noise scenario considered is a symmetric attack modeled by a depolarization channel: Definition 1.2. We define a symmetric attack to be one which may be modeled as a depolarization channel:
In particular, the observable noise is Q while any mismatched measurement events (such as a |+ being measured as a |0 after passing through this channel) are 1/2. Since such statistics are observable for the protocols considered in this work, this may even be enforced.
Our Protocol
Our protocol is a semi-quantum one and, as with all (S)QKD protocols, there are two primary stages: the quantum communication stage, and the classical post-processing stage. The first uses the two-way quantum channel and the authenticated classical channel to establish a raw-key while the second estimates the noise in the channel and, assuming this is not "too high" (to be discussed) then processes this raw-key to output a shared secret key. Our protocol may be run in one of two modes depending on the quantum user A's capabilities: in MODE-2, only two bases are used (the Z and the X basis) whereas in MODE-3, three bases are used by A (Z, X, and Y ) -of course, regardless of A's capabilities, B can only measure and send in the Z basis. We will analyze the security of our protocol in both modes. The exact protocol is described in detail below:
Public Constants:
• Mode = MODE-2 or MODE-3, specifying the mode of operation (based on A's quantum capabilities, namely whether she can work with 2 or 3 bases).
• p, q ∈ (0, 1), probability values for certain choices.
Quantum Communication Stage:
This stage repeats the following process until a sufficiently large raw-key is produced.
Alice's Preparation:
• With probability p, A sets an internal private register b A = Z; otherwise, with probability 1 − p, she sets b A to be X if Mode = MODE-2 or she sets b A to be X or Y (with probability (1 − p)/2 each) if Mode = MODE-3.
• If b A = Z, A sets an internal private register k A to be 0 or 1 with uniform probability and she sends the computational qubit state |k A to B.
• Otherwise, if b A = X, A sends the state |+ to B; or, if b A = Y (which only happens when Mode = MODE-3), she sends the state |0 Y to B. Note that A does not need to prepare and send states of the form |− or |1 Y .
Bob's Operation:
• When B receives a qubit, he will choose to either Measure and Resend or to Reflect, saving his choice in a private internal register Choice B . If he chooses Measure and Resend, he saves his measurement result (a 0 or a 1 as he can only measure in the Z basis) in a private register k B . The probability of choosing Measure and Resend is p.
Alice's Measurement:
• A will choose a basis to measure in, randomly, following the same distribution as in step 1 (however, the basis choice here will be independent of her initial choice thus allowing for mismatched measurements). Let b A be the register storing her basis choice. A will then perform a measurement in this basis saving the result in a register m A (which may take on any value in the set {0, 1, +, −, 0 Y , 1 Y } based on the measurement outcome).
• If b A = b A = Z and if m A = k A (i.e., she measures the same state she sent in the Z basis), A sets an internal register Accept = 1; otherwise it is set to 0.
• With probability 1 − q, A will set an internal register Test = 1; otherwise it is set to 0.
4. Communication: (Note this step may be performed "in bulk" for all iterations, after performing the above steps for sufficiently long.)
• Using the authenticated channel, A discloses (b A , Accept, Test) and B discloses Choice B .
• If Accept = 1, Test = 0, and Choice B = Measure and Resend, then they will use this iteration's results to contribute towards their raw key. Such an iteration is called a key-distillation iteration as it successfully adds to the raw-key length. In particular A uses k A as a new raw-key bit while B uses k B .
• Otherwise, if the above condition is not true, this iteration is not used and instead it will be used later to determine statistics on the quantum channel noise (in particular, B will send k B in this case). Note that mismatched results (when A chooses different preparation and measurement bases) are not discarded.
Following the quantum communication stage, and assuming the noise level is low enough (which we will compute), error correction followed by privacy amplification will output a secret key. These are standard processes and for more information, the reader is referred to [35] .
We note that the Communication stage, listed above, can actually be completed "in bulk" after the quantum communication stage is completed. Also, in the asymptotic setting, the choice of p and q may be made arbitrarily close to 1 thus increasing the protocol efficiency (as was done, for example, with BB84 in [41] and also semi-quantum protocols in [2] ). Note that in the finite key setting, the choice of p and q would be very important (as they will lead to differing efficiency and differing sample sizes for error estimation). However, in this work, we consider only the asymptotic scenario.
Security Analysis
Our goal is to compute a bound on the Devetak-Winter key-rate expression (Equation 4) as a function only of observable statistics. That is, we compute a bound as a function only on parameters that may be observed from iterations which are not used for key-distillation in our protocol (see the Communication stage of our protocol). First, however, we require a description of the density operator, describing A, B, and E's systems, for all key-distillation iterations (as those are the iterations from which error correction and privacy amplification are run, thereby leading to a secret key).
We analyze collective attacks in this paper so as to immediately compare our results with those in [34] where Classical Advantage Distillation (CAD) [33] was applied to BB84. That work computed mutual quantum information as functions of collective attacks and so the most natural comparison would be to compute similar expressions when E uses collective attacks. While, in [34] , the results of course extend to general attacks (through standard techniques) and, normally, collective attacks imply security against general attacks for permutation invariant protocols (it is not difficult to make our protocol permutation invariant in the usual way by having A and B permute their raw-key bits using a randomly chosen permutation [40] ) [37, 38] , a rigorous proof of security for general attacks is outside the scope of this work. Nonetheless, we suspect that the results and computations, besides being of interest to compare with the BB84+CAD results, will extend to the general security setting in the usual way. Furthermore, our results here can also be used for finite-key analyses (where collective attacks are often studied) and that may also be of interesting future work.
A collective attack against a semi-quantum protocol, may be modeled without loss of generality as a pair of unitary attack operators (U F , U R ) each acting on H T ⊗ H E , where H T is the two-dimensional Hilbert space modeling the qubit in transit between A and B (and later between B and A) while H E is the Hilbert space modeling E's quantum memory (whose dimension is arbitrary). On each iteration, after A sends a qubit initially to B in the forward channel, E will apply U F ; when the qubit returns from B to A, E will apply U R (acting on the same space that U F acted on, thus the action of U R may depend on U F ). There are no assumptions on measurement strategy in a collective attack; indeed E is free to postpone her measurement to any future point in time and is allowed to make, later, any arbitrary optimal coherent measurement of her entire memory through the protocol's operation.
At the start of each iteration, we may assume E prepares a fresh ancilla in some pure state known to her: |χ E . From this, we may describe U F and U R 's action as follows:
Our goal, now, is to construct a density operator ρ ABE describing one iteration of the protocol in which a key bit was successfully distilled. The entire run of the protocol, for all key-distillation iterations, will then be ρ ⊗N ABE where N is the size of the raw-key. Once this state is computed, we will then compute (or rather bound) S(A|E) ρ .
Conditioning on an iteration being used for key-distillation, A must send a |0 or |1 , saving the value in an internal register k A . E then attacks the traveling qubit using U F and sends the qubit in H T to B who performs a Z basis measurement (since he must choose Measure and Resend for this iteration to potentially yield a new raw-key bit). His measurement result is saved in his private register (which, below, we denote as simply B). The resulting density operator, thus far, is easily found to be:
Now, B will send a qubit in the same state he observed it in and E will attack with U R . Following this, A will then measure in the Z basis, saving her result in a new register m A . This results in the following density operator: Finally, A and B will only keep this iteration as a key-distillation iteration, if k A = m A . Thus, conditioning on this event, the final quantum state, ρ ABE , is found to be:
where we now use the A register to denote A's raw-key bit (the B register is B's raw-key bit), and where N is the following normalization term: To compute the key-rate r, and also the effective key-rate r, we need to determine, or bound, those inner-products appearing in the expressions above. This will be done by looking at various measurement statistics, including mismatched measurements. When using MODE-2, we will rely on results from [3] (which we summarize in the next sub-section) to determine these bounds. When using MODE-3, we will consider new measurement statistics and show how they can greatly improve the noise tolerance of the resulting protocol (furthermore, the results we derive when analyzing this three-basis case, can be applied to other two-way protocols and may be of great use to future research in quantum cryptography).
Parameter Estimation for MODE-2
When using our protocol in MODE-2, we are able to rely on the method of mismatched measurements, for two-way channels from [3] to derive appropriate bounds on the innerproducts appearing in the expression for S(A|E) derived above. In this subsection we review these derivations, however, for greater detail the reader is referred to [3] . Denote by p A→B i,j , for i ∈ {0, 1, +} and j ∈ {0, 1} to be the probability that B measures |j conditioned on the event A initially sent |i and that B chose the Measure and Resend operation. Also, denote by p A→A i,j,k for i and j as before and k ∈ {0, 1, +, −} to be the probability that A observes |k (when a qubit returns to her) conditioned on the event she initially sent |i and that B measured (and thus resent) |j (that is, we condition on the event that B chose operation Measure and Resend and he actually observed |j ). Finally, denote by p A→A i,R,k to be similar, except conditioned on the event B chose to Reflect. Note that certain events measure the error in the quantum channel (such as p A→B 0,1 ) while some measure mismatched measurements (such as p A→B +,0 ). Regardless, these probabilities are all, clearly, observable by users A and B and we will use them to derive bounds on the various inner products appearing in the entropy equations from the previous section.
For simplicity in notation (and, also, to compare with BB84+CAD in [34] ), we consider a symmetric attack whereby the noise in the quantum channel may be parameterized as follows:
Note that this assumption of a symmetric channel, though common in QKD security proofs, is not required in our analysis (and, to consider a non-symmetric channel, our analysis below may be followed) however it does simplify the notation and algebra. Furthermore, such a symmetric channel may even be enforced by users.
From this, we have the following:
Consider, now, p A→A +,R,− = Q X (the error in the X basis of the entire two-way channel ). It was shown in [3] that: 
We must actually minimize S(A|E) ( Equation 9) to compute the key-rate as we must assume the worst case that Eve chooses an optimal attack, within the above constraints. To minimize this expression in this symmetric case, it is not difficult to see that we must find the smallest Λ i values. From Equation 13 we have:
When evaluating our key-rate bound using MODE-2, we must therefore assume that Λ 1 +Λ 2 is in fact equal to the above lower bound and simply optimize over all Λ 2 satisfying:
(the above follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality). Note that we cannot simply assume Λ 2 = −Q F Q R as this may not optimize H(λ 2 ) in Equation 9.
Parameter Estimation for MODE-3
We now turn our attention to our protocol in MODE-3. While the use of mismatched measurements for two basis semi-quantum protocols had been developed in [3] , the use of three bases has never before been considered (either through mismatched measurements nor, to our knowledge, in any SQKD protocol). Thus we extend those results and introduce this analysis for the first time here; furthermore, we expect these results to extend to future SQKD protocols reliant on three bases and even other fully-quantum protocols reliant on a two-way quantum channel. When operating in MODE-3, in addition to those statistics analyzed in the previous section, we also are able to incorporate states where A initially sends and/or finally measures in the Y basis. We first consider the case when B chooses Reflect. In this case, the iteration is, essentially, a one-way channel with E attacking through the unitary operator V = U R U F . We may write the action of V on basis states as follows (recall that Eve starts with her ancilla in the state |χ E ):
where each |g i is a linear function of the |e Consider, then, Q X = p +,R,− which, in this notation, is easily found to be:
Assuming E's attack is symmetric and if p +,R,− = p 0 Y ,R,1 Y , then it was shown in [3] that, for this "one-way" attack (one-way attacks were analyzed in three bases in that prior work), it holds:
That is to say, it holds that Re g 0 |g 1 = Re g 2 |g 3 = Re g 1 |g 2 = 0. Using Equation 16 to expand Re g 0 |g 3 yields: 
We will show that, under a symmetric attack, the real part of the two right-most inner products are in fact zero. We start by considering p . Tracing the evolution of the qubit as it travels through Eve's lab in the forward channel, is measured by B and observed to be 0 (i.e., we are conditioning on the outcome being |0 for this statistic), attacked by E again, and finally returning to A. The state is found to be: Note that, under a symmetric attack, the above are all zero. These identities will become important momentarily.
Next, we consider statistics of the form p A→A 0 Y ,j,0 Y for j ∈ {0, 1} (again, under a symmetric attack, these should be 1/2). First, consider the case when j = 0. Tracing the evolution of the qubit in this instance, we find: 
Under a symmetric attack, it is not difficult to see that both imaginary parts are zero. This follows from the fact that p
). Similarly, it is easy to see that:
which is also zero under a symmetric attack. Thus, these four imaginary parts appearing in Equation 23 can all be determined through observable statistics. In the event of a symmetric attack (in which case those imaginary parts are zero, and p 
Note this is significantly improved over the bound attained when only considering two bases (Equation 15). To evaluate S(A|E) in MODE-3, we must simply minimize the above expression over all
Evaluation
The equations derived in the previous section apply to any symmetric channel (and with some additional algebra can easily be extended to arbitrary non-symmetric channels). To evaluate our bounds, however, we consider two forms of symmetric attacks in particular: independent and dependent channels. Both cases are parameterized by two values Q, the Z basis error in one channel (i.e., Q F = Q R = Q) and Q X the X (and Y ) basis error observed when the qubit travels through both channels (when B reflects); i.e.,
For the independent case we have Q X = 2Q(1−Q) (i.e., an error in the reflection case, where a qubit has to travel through both channels, occurs if the qubit flips in the forward channel but not the reverse or it flips in the reverse channel but not the forward). The second case, the dependent channel, we take to mean Q X = Q. These two channels are commonly evaluated when discussing security and noise tolerances of two-way protocols in general [8] and so we consider them here. We stress, however, that our key-rate bound is applicable to any observed quantum noise.
We evaluate our key-rate bound under these two assumptions looking for the maximal Q for which r > 0; these results are shown in Table 1 . This noise tolerance is substantially higher, in both cases, than any prior SQKD protocol which currently has a noise tolerance analysis (for a comparison see Table 2 ). This is also higher than BB84 without CAD (to be discussed). We also plot the key-rate and the effective key-rate in Figures 2 and 3 . For the effective key-rate, we use Equation 3 with p acc = (1 − Q) 2 + Q 2 .
Comparison to BB84 with CAD
Considering the positive results in the previous section, it is useful to compare to equivalent fully-quantum protocols and also to attempt to discover exactly why the noise tolerance is so high in our protocol. Note that, since A is rejecting all iterations where she does not receive the same Z basis qubit state she initially sent, this serves to greatly reduce the raw-key
17.8% 26.0% Table 1 : Maximal noise tolerance of our SQKD protocol under both dependent and independent channel scenarios. Note that under all cases, the noise tolerance is higher than four state BB84 (which is 11% [40] ) and for all, except MODE-2 in the independent case, is also higher than six-state BB84 (which is 12.6% [40] ). error. That is, A and B can expect to end the protocol with a raw-key that is more highly correlated than previous SQKD protocols (thus reducing the information leaked during error correction). However, such a process can also be done classically to, say, BB84 through the use of classical advantage distillation (CAD). In this section we compare our protocol to BB84 with CAD to show similarities, but also interesting quantum-level differences.
Recall the BB84 protocol (including the six-state BB84), the quantum communication stage of which consists of the following process:
• Mode = XZ or XYZ specifying whether to use two bases (Z and X) or three (Z, X, and Y ). Furthermore, we consider the asymmetric version of BB84 [40] whereby only the Z basis is used for key distillation while any other basis is used only for error testing.
• p ∈ (0, 1), the probability of choosing the Z basis in a particular iteration.
Quantum Communication Stage:
Alice's Preparation:
• With probability p, A sets an internal private register to b A = Z; otherwise, with probability 1 − p, she sets b A to be X if Mode = XZ or she sets b A to be X or Y (with probability (1 − p)/2 each) if Mode = XYZ.
• If b A = Z, then A sets an internal private register k A to be 0 or 1 with uniform probability and she sends the computational qubit state |k A to B.
• Otherwise, if b A = X, A sends the state |+ or |− to B (choosing uniformly at random and, of course, saving her choice in a private register); or, if b A = Y (which only happens when Mode = XYZ), she sends the state |0 Y or |1 Y to B (again, choosing uniformly at random).
Bob's Operation:
• When B receives a qubit he will set an internal private register b B to Z with probability p; otherwise, with probability 1 − p, if Mode = XZ, he will set b B to be X or, if Mode = XYZ, he will set it to be X or Y (with probability (1 − p)/2 each).
• Bob will measure the qubit in the basis specified by b B , saving the result.
3. Communication: (Note this step may be performed after performing the above steps for sufficiently long.)
• Using the authenticated channel, A discloses b A and B discloses b B . For any iteration where b A = b B = Z, they will save their preparation (for A) and measurement (for B) results to use as their raw key. For all other iterations, A and B will disclose complete information on their choices and measurement outcomes for use in error checking.
• A will chose a random subset of the raw key for use in error checking -namely, for any iteration in this subset, A and B will disclose their raw key result on this subset (and, of course, remove these results from their raw key).
Note that, as shown in [41] , in the asymptotic scenario, we may set p arbitrarily close to 1 to improve efficiency of the protocol.
Following the execution of this protocol, before further processing the raw-key through error correction and privacy amplification, users may choose to perform a Classical Advantage Distillation (CAD) protocol. This is a two-way communication process using the authenticated classical channel, which attempts to create an additional advantage for A and B over E by processing the raw key and producing a new, shorter, raw key. This shorter key is then, subsequently processed further with error correction and privacy amplification. We will consider the following CAD protocol, discussed in detail in [33, 34] , which is parameterized by a block-length parameter C ≥ 1:
1. A will select a group of raw-key bits of size C such that all C bits are the same value (all will be 0 or all will be 1). A then sends the indices of these bits to B (of course, she keeps their value secret).
2. B will check his raw key to see if all C bits are the same value on his end. If they are, he will tell A to "accept" this block; otherwise to "reject." (Note that all communication in this step and the previous are done using the authenticated classical channel.)
3. If B accepts, both parties compress the C equal-valued bits to a single bit in the natural way; this new bit is added to the new raw-key while the old block of C bits is discarded from the original raw-key. If B rejects, both parties discard all C bits.
We denote by BB84-XZ[C] to mean four-state BB84 using CAD with a block size of C; similarly, we use BB84-XYZ[C] to mean the same for the six-state BB84.
Observe that, even in the noise-less case, the new raw-key will shrink by a factor of 1/C (i.e., if the original raw-key before CAD was M bits long, the new raw-key will be only M/C bits long). In the event the channel is noisy, this loss of raw-key material may be even more extreme. However, the advantage to this process is that the new raw-key should be more highly correlated than the previous one (indeed, for an error to exist in the new raw key, all C bits on B's end must be wrong -an event which occurs with probability, roughly, ∼ Q C ). In [34] , the BB84 protocol (both the four and six state versions) were analyzed with this particular CAD process. In that source, they computed the key-rate to be:
is the error in the new raw-key (after applying CAD) -this is easy to compute as the error will be the probability that all C bits are wrong on B's end (with probability Q C ) conditioned on the probability that CAD "accepts" the block (which happens only if they are all equal or all different, thus this occurs with probability Q C + (1 − Q) C ). The eigenvalues Λ eq and Λ dif depend on whether one is considering the four or six state protocol. Using here also results in [34] , we have:
where, for four-state BB84, we must optimize over all λ 4 ∈ [0, Q].
Returning to our protocol, we note that there is a similarity to running BB84 with CAD, setting C = 2. Of course, to perform a fair comparison, we must also consider the effective key-rate of both protocols. For our SQKD protocol, we use Equation 3 where we have p acc = (1 − Q) 2 + Q 2 . For BB84 using CAD with a block size of C, it is not difficult to see that:
where N is the expected raw-key size, K is the number of qubits prepared in total, and
A graph of the resulting key-rates is shown in Figure 4 . Here we notice that the six-state BB84 almost exactly agrees with our protocol in MODE-3 for the independent channel case (note that, in this case, the X basis error rate for our protocol is almost twice what it is for BB84 ). There is a striking improvement in key-rate in the dependent case (especially for MODE-3). Also, standard four state BB84 with a CAD block size of two agrees with our protocol in the independent case with MODE-2 for low noise levels; however as the noise increases BB84 with a CAD size of two improves slightly (this is similar to the difference between MODE-3 on the independent channel case, and BB84-XYZ [2] though there the difference was less noticeable). A summary comparison of noise tolerances is shown in Figure Figure 4 : Showing the effective key-rate of our protocol, compared with the effective key-rate of BB84 with CAD applied using a block size of 2. Note that BB84-XYZ [2] is not shown as it agrees almost entirely with MODE-3 in the Independent channel case (BB84-XYZ [2] 's effective key-rate was indistinguishable in this graph; however it does have slightly higher noise tolerance of 18.1%, it is only when the noise approaches this that the effective key-rate of BB84-XYZ [2] increases slightly above MODE-3 in the independent case). 5. In fact, it is not until C approaches 18 that the noise tolerance of BB84 begins to exceed MODE-3 on a dependent channel.
To look at this further, let us compare not the final key-rate of our protocol to BB84 with CAD, but instead only E's uncertainty as measured by S(A|E) on a raw-key iteration. Rather surprisingly, we show that E's uncertainty is greater in our case than in the case of BB84 with CAD for certain channels. Again, using computations from [34] , and the definition of quantum mutual information: I(A : E) = S(A) + S(E) − S(AE) = S(A) − S(A|E) = 1 − S(A|E) (since we are assuming a symmetric attack in both protocols thus A's key bit is unbiased and, so, equally likely to be 0 or 1 yielding S(A) = 1). In this case, it is trivial algebra to show (using Equation 24 and basic definitions of mutual information): Figure 6 shows a comparison of S(A|E) for our protocol and BB84 with CAD in the independent case; Figure 7 shows the same but for the dependent channel case. For the dependent case, Eve's uncertainty is far greater than BB84 [2] in all cases except for MODE-2 when Q > 25%; note that in this channel scenario, for both our protocol and BB84, we are using Z and X basis noise levels of Q. For the independent case, the uncertainty E has on A's raw key bit is almost identical between MODE-3 and BB84-XYZ [2] . For MODE-2 and BB84-XZ [2] , the latter admits greater uncertainty for Eve. Note that, in this independent case, we are evaluating BB84 with a Z and X basis error rate of Q while we are evaluating our protocol with a higher X basis noise level of 2Q(1 − Q).
Note that the dependent channel case, over which our protocol shows a significant improvement, is a realistic possibility for some fiber channels where any phase error picked up in the forward direction is "undone" in the reverse [8, 42] . Thus, we summarize that if such a channel were implemented in practice, our SQKD protocol (or perhaps another fully-quantum two way protocol augmented with the techniques we developed in this paper) may be an excellent candidate to improve secure communication. However, even in the independent case, we achieve a very similar noise tolerance and effective key-rate to BB84 with CAD, without having to perform a two-way CAD process over the authenticated channel.
Closing Remarks
In this paper, we showed how a semi-quantum protocol may be constructed which, by taking advantage of the two-way quantum channel, can tolerate high levels of noise. We performed a security analysis and key-rate computation for our protocol comparing to several other QKD protocols (see Table 2 for a comparison of noise tolerances). Our proof of security developed new techniques to take advantage of three-bases with mismatched measurements over two-way channels; these techniques may be applicable to the proof of security of other (S)QKD protocols utilizing two-way quantum communication channels. We also compared our protocol to BB84 with CAD and showed some interesting similarities and differences in Figure 6 : Showing E's uncertainty, as measured by S(A|E) of our protocol, along with BB84 with a CAD block size of 2. For our two-way protocol, we are assuming an independent channel in this figure. That is, for our SQKD protocol, the X basis error rate is almost twice what it is when evaluating BB84 in this graph. Figure 7 : Showing E's uncertainty, as measured by S(A|E) of our protocol, along with BB84 with a CAD block size of 2. For our two-way protocol, we are assuming a dependent channel in this figure. Higher uncertainty is better for A and B. Table 2 : Showing the maximal tolerated noise of various protocols, including our own (first two rows denoted MODE-2 and MODE-3), in both modes of operation. For two-way protocols, we show the noise tolerance for independent and dependent channels; for one-way protocols the distinction is not applicable so we only show a single value. BB84-XZ[C] denotes four state BB84 with CAD applied to a block-size of C (BB84-XYZ[C] is the six-state version). We use BB84-· · · [∞] to denote theoretical BB84 with CAD using a block size C → ∞.
the two settings. Our protocol exhibits higher noise tolerance and efficiency than BB84 with CAD over certain, realistic, channel scenarios. Many interesting future problems remain open. First, we did not consider finite key settings, and so it would be interesting to consider this. We utilized numerous mismatched statistics to get our high noise tolerance in the asymptotic setting; while our work here compares favorably with other protocols in the asymptotic setting, it would be interesting to see if this continues to hold true if finite resources are used. Second, we considered ideal settings; security under practical devices is only just beginning to be realized in the semi-quantum setting [30, 31] and it would be interesting to try and adapt some of those techniques to our protocol presented here. Finally, it would be interesting to apply the three-basis mismatched measurement technique we used here to other semi-quantum (or fully-quantum) protocols using a two-way quantum channel; we suspect that improvements to noise tolerances may be established in these cases using the techniques we developed in this paper.
